there is something wrong with this process. this just shows that the identification details for the cert is entered by a middle man and there's no Identity verification AND authentication.
Simply put, the primary key (in database speak) for this cert is your IC number. And this is verified only by means of visually looking at your IC by the middle man. The potential problem from this is Identity theft. Some smart fella in IRB could have 'mistakenly' generated a cert for you and 'hilang' it to who knows where.
Secondly, there's no authentication for that digital cert. A digital cert consists of 2 parts: the public key (identity) and the private key (authentication).
The public key is like your face where you take photos of yourself and distribute it friends so they can associate your face to your name BUT the private key is your body's DNA.
What's happening here is that you didn't password protect your private key that means the middle man here can take your public+private key pair and store it somewhere for later 'use'.
And to make matters worse, they're not removing the generated certs from their workstation...
This digital cert should not be generated by IRB and it's more likely under the purview of JPN as it concerns identity.
Digital certs are a good way to go but the way it is implemented, it looks like they didn't look through the application and authentication process from a security standpoint very thoroughly.
There are many complications with implementing a national digital cert in terms of verification and maintenance/administration which I can truthfully say beyond me at the moment.
With the current half past six process, it looks safer to use the hardcopy rather than the softcopy. Safer only in terms that it'll require more effort to duplicate your identity (handwriting/signature compared to a 3rd party handling your digital cert).